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Figure 1 Indonesia: Real economic growth, 1965–2000
SourceWorld Bank, World Development Indicators CD-Rom.
1 Introduction
When the New Order came to power in Indonesia
in 1965, the country was undergoing a severe
economic crisis. Between 1961 and 1965, the
economy had stalled, with Net Domestic Product
rising only slightly from Rp 407billion to 
Rp 430billion in 1960 prices. At the same time, the
country’s export earnings had fallen dramatically
from US$ 750million to US$ 450million, making it
virtually impossible for the country to meet its
burgeoning foreign debt commitments. Inflation was
also spiralling out of control, caused by excessive
printing of money to fund growing government
budget deficits. In 1960 inflation stood at 20 per
cent per annum but by 1965 it had risen to almost
600 per cent. Poverty was also very severe, with 61
per cent of the population on Java and 52 per cent
of the population outside Java considered ‘very poor’
by one estimate. Although United Nations human
development scores are not available for Indonesia
during the mid-1960s, its socio-economic indicators
were poor, suggesting that its level of human
development was low (Arndt 1967: 130–1; Hill 1996:
3–5). So severe were Indonesia’s economic problems
that one leading economist at the time argued that
‘Indonesia must surely be accounted the number one
failure among the major underdeveloped countries’
(Higgins 1968, as quoted in Hill 1996: 1). At the same
time, the country was politically unstable, reflecting
intense rivalry between communist and radical
nationalist forces on the one hand, and counter-
revolutionary forces on the other. While this rivalry
led to only minor episodes of serious violent conflict
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it resulted in
massive violence once the New Order took power.
In an effort to eliminate its primary political rival (the
Indonesian Communist Party, PKI), the army
sponsored the murder of suspected communists
during 1966, resulting in hundreds of thousands of
deaths.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the country began a
process of turnaround. On the one hand, it
experienced strong economic growth and a
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Figure 2 Indonesia: human development index, 1975–2000
Source UNDP Indonesia (2001: 6).
significant improvement in human development over
the next three decades (Figures 1 and 2). Indeed, so
successful was the country in these respects that by
the early 1990s, the World Bank had identified it as
one of East Asia’s ‘miracle’ economies (World Bank
1993a). On the other hand, the country achieved
relative political stability. To be sure, there were
episodes of severe violent conflict during this period.
The country’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 resulted
in the death of, by some estimates, as many as one-
third of the East Timorese population, as well as
several thousand Indonesian troops (Schwarz 1994:
205). The government also became engaged in
armed struggles against separatist movements in
Aceh, Irian Jaya and (after 1975) East Timor. At times,
these regions – particularly Aceh and East Timor –
were effectively war zones. There were also
occasional riots, demonstrations and other events
outside these regions that turned bloody, such as the
Malari riots in Jakarta in January 1974 (in which 11
people were reportedly killed), the Moslem
demonstration in Tanjung Priok in 1984 (in which at
least 30 and possibly more than 100 people were
killed), and the inter-communal hostility in West
Kalimantan in 1996–7 (McDonald 1980: 138; Mackie
and MacIntyre 1994: 53; Young 2001). But the
country successfully avoided more widespread violent
conflict and, in particular, the sorts of violent
conflicts, such as civil wars and wars with
neighbouring countries, that have severely hampered
prospects for economic development in countries
such as Angola, the Sudan and Cambodia.
With the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997, the
pendulum again swung back towards poor economic
performance and increased violent conflict. The
collapse of the rupiah in 1997–8 led to a massive
contraction in the economy, widespread corporate
bankruptcy, and dramatic increases in inflation,
poverty and unemployment (Robison and Rosser
1998; Pincus and Ramli 1998). Having achieved ‘lower
middle income’ status in the World Bank’s country
rankings in the 1990s, Indonesia once again became
classified as a ‘low-income country’. While the
country’s level of human development has continued
to improve in the period since the crisis, the process
of economic recovery has been slow. At the same
time, the country has experienced increased violent
conflict, with renewed fighting in Aceh, a bloody
transition to independence in East Timor, the
emergence of severe ethnic and religious conflict in
the Moluccas, and widespread rioting throughout
the country particularly in the first part of 1998. This
has not resulted in a full-scale reversal of the gains
made vis-à-vis turnaround made during the previous
three decades but it has led to a partial reversal.
The purpose of this article is to explain Indonesia’s
performance regarding the turnaround in
independence in 1949 and the late 1990s
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and to
examine the role of donors in shaping this
performance. I argue that Indonesia’s performance
in the turnaround has reflected the orientations,
abilities and political skills of the country’s political
leaders during this time, particularly its two
Presidents, Sukarno and Suharto; struggles between
the main social and organisational forces within the
country and the emergence of new social forces; the
nature of the country’s geopolitical and geo-
economic environment; and ‘chance’ factors such as
economic shocks. In respect of the role of donors
during this time, I argue that donors contributed to
the process of initiating turnaround in the 1960s and
1970s through the provision of economic policy
advice and much-needed finance. I suggest that they
also contributed to the process of reversal by
encouraging the pattern of financial sector reform
that contributed to the crisis.
In presenting this explanation, I begin by examining
the origins of Indonesia’s economic, political and
social problems in the mid-1960s (Section 2). I then
examine the political economy of Indonesia’s
‘turnaround’ from the late 1960s onwards (Section
3), the origins of its economic and political crisis in
the late 1990s (Section 4), and the role of donors
during both the turnaround and partial reversal
phases (Section 5). In the final section of the article, I
examine the country’s prospects for further progress
in economic growth, human development, and
political stability in the future.
2 The origins of economic turmoil and violent
conflict in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s
The country’s economic and political problems during
the mid-1960s reflected in part President Sukarno’s
limitations as an economic manager. Sukarno was a
skilful politician and nation-builder. But as McDonald
(1980: 68) has noted, he was ‘a dilettante in
economic policy’. Notwithstanding the country’s
rapid economic decline during the early 1960s, he
became increasingly unrealistic in terms of the
economic policy agenda that he pursued. Sukarno’s
commitment to Indonesian nationalism in the
political realm translated into an anti-imperialism in
the economic realm that worsened the economic
crisis. As Bresnan (1993: 54) has argued, ‘Sukarno
simply did not understand the roots of the economic
deterioration that was eroding the people’s welfare’.
But, while Sukarno’s limitations as an economic
manager undoubtedly contributed to the country’s
economic problems during the mid-1960s, these
problems had deeper social and political roots. More
specifically, they reflected the bitter struggle for
power between radical nationalist and communist
forces on the one hand, and counter-revolutionary
forces on the other, that began during the 1945–9
struggle for independence. At one level, this was a
struggle between particular organisations, with the
Indonesian army being the most important
organisation on the counter-revolutionary side, and
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) being the
most important organisation on the communist and
radical nationalist side. At another level, however, it
was a struggle between particular class interests,
with the army being aligned with propertied
elements in the countryside, the country’s major
ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, and foreign capitalists
(Anderson 1983; Robison 1986) and the PKI being
aligned with the Indonesian peasantry and the labour
movement (Wertheim 1969; Hadiz 1997). This
struggle was central to Indonesian politics during the
periods of parliamentary rule and Guided Democracy
that followed independence.
During the early to mid-1950s, the rivalry between
these two sets of forces posed relatively little threat
to the country’s economic development and political
stability, as neither group was strong enough to seize
power. But by the late 1950s, it had become a
serious threat to both, as both sets of forces began
to assert themselves, the former following the
army’s successful quelling of a series of regional
rebellions and a process of internal reform that
consolidated power in the hands of military
headquarters in Jakarta, and the latter following the
PKI’s strong performance in a number of elections. A
key moment in this respect came in 1957. Provoked
by Dutch intransigence over the future of West Irian
(which had remained in Dutch hands after
independence), trade unions aligned with the PKI
began seizing control of Dutch assets. Although the
Sukarno government initially tried to clamp down on
these seizures, widespread popular support for the
move forced it to accept the fait accompli and
nationalise the assets (Legge 1972: 293). A few years
later, PKI-led trade unions also seized British and
American assets, again leading to forced
nationalisations. Another key moment came in the
early 1960s with the introduction of new land
reform legislation. Early attempts to implement the
new laws foundered because of opposition from
landholders who dominated the local boards
responsible for land reform and were able to use
their positions and close relationships with local
government and military officials to prevent
redistribution of their lands. In 1963, the Indonesian
Peasant Front, a peasants’ organisation aligned with
the PKI, began encouraging peasants to unilaterally
seize and redistribute land, an action that triggered
violent clashes in a number of rural areas (Crouch
1988: 63–4; Robison 1993).
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These developments contributed to the economic
and political problems of the mid-1960s in three
ways. First, they provoked widespread capital flight.
The seizure of foreign assets and land signalled to
mobile investors that their investments were no
longer secure and that it was sensible for them to
exercise their exit option. Many did just that (Winters
1996: 47). Second, these developments provoked
Sukarno into pursuing an economically disastrous
strategy of mass mobilisation around a nationalistic
agenda in an attempt to maintain national unity
(Feith 1963). One part of this strategy was the pursuit
of prestige development projects such as the
building of the five-star Hotel Indonesia, a new
national monument (Monas) and the prestigious
Sarinah department store in Jakarta. Another was
‘Confrontation’ with Malaysia over the planned
formation of a federal Malay state. While these
measures served a short-term political logic, they
contributed to a severe blowout in the government
budget. Third, these developments increased class-
based tension between the army and the PKI. The
army assumed control of most of the nationalised
assets, and as such, was now in a directly
antagonistic class-based relationship with the
peasants and workers who worked in these
enterprises, many of whom were members of the
PKI. Because many army officers were landholders, it
was in a similar position in relation to the land issues.
In the end, the crises created by these developments
engulfed Sukarno and his government. A failed coup
attempt involving sections of the military and the PKI
during September and October 1965 precipitated
Sukarno’s removal from office, the downfall of his
government, the rise of the military-backed ‘New
Order’ under Major-General Suharto, and the violent
annihilation of communist and radical nationalist
forces during 1966.
3 The political economy of ‘turnaround’
3.1 Initiating turnaround, 1966–70
When the New Order came to power, it
immediately set about overcoming the economic
crisis. Together with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the government
devised a programme of economic stabilisation and
rehabilitation. Initially, its focus was on stabilising the
economy through rescheduling Indonesia’s massive
foreign debts, attracting foreign aid to cover
essential imports, and reducing inflation through
stringent monetary and fiscal policies. Once it had
stabilised the economy, its attention turned to
rehabilitating the economy through measures
designed to attract investment and promote growth.
These included the easing of bank credit, reductions
in interest rates, the introduction of new foreign and
domestic investment laws, increased development
spending, and the formulation of a five-year
development plan. Both the stabilisation and
rehabilitation measures were remarkably successful.
By 1969, inflation had been brought under control
and by 1970, the ratio of exports to gross domestic
product (GDP) had recovered to the same level as in
1960. In addition, the economy began growing
strongly again in the late 1960s, contributing to a
rapid recovery in real national income per capita
(McDonald 1980: 79; Rosser 2002: 40–1).
Just as Indonesia’s economic and political crises
during the mid-1960s reflected in part Sukarno’s
limitations as an economic manager, so the country’s
initial progress towards turnaround during the late
1960s partly reflected Suharto’s leadership. Suharto
was just as much a dilettante in economic matters as
Sukarno. But he recognised, perhaps because of
Sukarno’s experience, that his government’s survival
depended on its ability to revive the economy and
promote capitalist development. More specifically, he
recognised that it depended on the introduction of
the sort of economic policies advocated by a group
of professional economists based at the University of
Indonesia, collectively known as the technocrats.
Liddle (1991: 405–6) has suggested that Suharto
sought the technocrats’ advice because ‘they were
well trained neoclassical and development
economists, practitioners of the most advanced of
the social sciences, possessors of genuine science in
a still very unscientific society’. More likely, however,
he sought their advice because, with both Western
donors and mobile investors signalling a desire for a
market-oriented shift in the government’s economic
policies (Winters 1996: 47–94), he realised that the
government was unlikely to attract the financial
assistance and investment that it needed to
overcome the economic crisis unless the technocrats
were given a key role in economic policy making.
At the same time, however, the country’s initial
progress towards turnaround was not simply a
reflection of Suharto’s calculations and instincts.
More fundamentally, it reflected the political victory
of counter-revolutionary forces over radical
nationalist and communist forces. The victory of the
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former set of forces laid the basis for the country’s
strong initial performance vis-à-vis turnaround in two
ways. First, it made it politically easier for the
government to reorient economic policy away from
the anti-imperialist and interventionist strategy of
the Sukarno years and towards the market-oriented
strategy advocated by the technocrats. With
communist and radical nationalist forces defeated,
the New Order faced little domestic opposition to
reversing the policies that had served to provoke
capital flight such as the nationalisation of Dutch and
other foreign assets and the PKI-inspired land
reform programme and introducing new policies
aimed at providing a more secure and attractive
investment environment. Second, the victory of
counter-revolutionary forces over radical nationalist
and communist forces provided a strong incentive for
the US government and other Western
governments to assist the New Order in overcoming
the economic crisis. The New Order gained power
at a time when the Vietnam War was just beginning
and there was widespread fear within the USA and
other Western countries that communism would
spread, domino-like, throughout the rest of
Southeast Asia. Specifically, the USA had been very
concerned about the growing strength and influence
of the PKI in Indonesia during the late 1950s and
early 1960s and was worried that it might at some
point take power (Ricklefs 1981: 259–69). When the
New Order seized power in 1965, the USA and
other Western governments were thus keen to
provide it with the advice and assistance it needed to
consolidate its rule.
3.2 Achieving and sustaining turnaround, 1970–7
Over the two and a half decades, the New Order
made even further progress. The economy grew
strongly during the 1970s, as Figure 1 shows. At the
same time, the country also made marked progress
in terms of human development, with its human
development index (HDI) score rising from 0.465 in
1975 to 0.526 in 1980. The country also maintained
political stability, not experiencing severe violent
conflict outside of those regions in which separatist
conflicts were raging such as East Timor and Aceh.
Two factors facilitated this progress vis-à-vis
turnaround. The first of these was that the country
benefited from a number of favourable economic
shocks (Temple 2004: 153). For instance, Indonesia
was able to benefit from the development of new
high-yielding varieties of rice by the International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines in the
1960s because of the importance of wet rice
agriculture to its economy at the time and the fact
that the new rice varieties were particularly suitable
to Indonesia’s conditions. As an oil exporting
economy, Indonesia also benefited enormously from
the 1970s oil boom. The massive increase in
government revenues that the oil boom generated
provided the government with huge funds to pursue
its development agenda. Finally, the country also
benefited from the fact that it was part of the
fastest growing economic region in the world
between the 1960s and 1990s. This proved
particularly important during the late 1980s and early
1990s when, following the collapse of international
oil prices, the government desperately sought to
attract foreign investment in export-oriented
manufacturing industries from its neighbours. But it
was also important during the early New Order
period, when it was trying to attract investment,
from Japan in particular, into the country’s natural
resource industries. All of these factors were crucial
in promoting economic growth and improved levels
of human development in Indonesia during the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
The second factor that facilitated progress towards
turnaround during this period was Suharto’s
successful management of the politics surrounding
the process of economic reform during the 1960s
and 1970s. In part, this successful management relied
on the use of authoritarian political controls. In the
early 1970s, the New Order emasculated the political
parties by forcing them to submit to a dramatic
simplification of the party system and interfering
directly in their leadership elections (McDonald
1980). At the same time, it established a series of
corporatist-style organisations under the control of
Golkar (the government’s electoral vehicle) ostensibly
to represent social groups such as women, labour,
domestic business, and peasants but in reality to
control them (MacIntyre 1990). In the mid-1980s, it
forced all mass organisations to accept Pancasila, the
state ideology, as their ‘sole foundation’, limiting
these organisations’ scope for ideological
independence (Adnan 1990). Finally, it restricted
freedom of the press through a punitive system of
press licensing and editorial interference (Hill 1994;
Lubis 1993). By limiting social groups’ freedom of
organisation and expression, the New Order
dramatically limited the extent to which these
groups could organise themselves and criticise
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government policy. As such, these measures made it
politically easier for the New Order to pursue its
programme of capitalist development.
At the same time, Suharto was also able to reduce
opposition to his government’s development strategy
by co-opting social groups that were critical of this
strategy, or which had the potential to become so in
the future. While the economic reforms of the late
1960s proved successful in attracting foreign and
ethnic Chinese capital back into the country, they
created distributional tensions in two ways: by making
it difficult for many small indigenous capitalists to
survive – as Palmer (1978) has noted, the late 1960s
and early 1970s saw many small indigenous
entrepreneurs go to the wall – and by doing little to
benefit Indonesians who lived in rural areas and who
depended on agriculture for their livelihoods. By the
early 1970s, the New Order’s development strategy
was being widely criticised, particularly by student
groups, journalists and indigenous capitalists, for
promoting foreign economic domination, corruption,
and growing inequality.
Initially Suharto did little to assuage the concerns of
these critics. But following widespread rioting in
Jakarta in early January 1974 after a visit by the
Japanese Prime Minister, he responded with a range
of measures aimed at promoting indigenous
businesses. These included the introduction of a
variety of preferential credit programmes for small
business people and rural entrepreneurs; a dramatic
expansion in the role of state-owned enterprises in
the economy; and the introduction of a programme
to promote indigenous businesses by giving them
preferential access to government supply and
construction contracts (Robison 1986: 164–8). In a
number of cases, these measures failed to produce
significant benefits for indigenous business groups –
for instance, much of the credit intended for small
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Figure 3 Government expenditure on agriculture, health and education as a proportion of total
development expenditure
SourceWoo et al. (1994).
indigenous entrepreneurs under preferential credit
programmes is believed to have been diverted to
well-connected Chinese entrepreneurs (Jenkins
1981). But by co-opting key sections of the
indigenous population such as the politico-
bureaucrats (who benefited from increased state
control over the economy) and larger indigenous
entrepreneurs (who were the prime beneficiaries of
the programme to provide preferential access to
government supply and construction contracts), they
served to ameliorate indigenous criticism of the
government’s development strategy and, in this way,
facilitate the process of turnaround.
At the same time, Suharto used some of the
country’s newly found oil wealth to make substantial
investments in agriculture, and public services such as
education and health, all areas in which indigenous
Indonesians were the major beneficiaries (Figure 3).
During the 1970s and early 1980s, his government
made a great effort to increase agricultural
production by promoting the use of high-yielding
rice varieties and subsidising the use of fertilisers and
other key inputs to the production process. Although
this effort was unsuccessful at first (Hansen 1978), by
the 1980s, the country had achieved self-sufficiency
in rice. In the education sector, the government
funded a massive expansion of the school system,
particularly the primary school system (Hull and
Jones 1994: 164), contributing to significant
improvements in national education and literacy
levels. It also funded a big expansion of the public
health system, although as Hill (1996: 212) has noted,
this appears to have been relatively ineffective in
promoting improved social welfare outcomes: ‘public
expenditure in the health sector’, he says, was ‘less
effectively focused and less pro-poor and pro-rural
than that of education'. Again, the benefits of these
measures were not evenly distributed. For instance,
the government’s agricultural policies appear to have
disproportionately benefited larger farmers because
they were better placed to adopt the new rice
technologies, given their greater access to
preferential credit and other key inputs (Husken and
White 1989: 236). Nevertheless, by co-opting key
sections of the rural population and producing at
least some material benefits for the poor, they
served to reduce potential political opposition to the
government’s development strategy. In this way, like
the measures at promoting indigenous business that
were discussed above, they served to facilitate strong
performance regarding the turnaround.
These investments also had the effect of reducing
the scope for violent social conflict in Indonesia. The
success of the government’s agricultural
modernisation programme was particularly
important in this respect. Political unrest in Indonesia
has often been related to rapidly rising urban food
prices. By ensuring reliable supplies of rice to urban
areas at stable prices, the New Order’s agricultural
modernisation programme served to limit the scope
for political unrest in the cities. At the same time, its
agricultural policies also served to reduce the scope
for political unrest in rural areas. Rural farmers in
Java had been one of the key sources of support for
the PKI and, although the PKI was banned and many
of its members were jailed or murdered in the mid-
1960s, the New Order feared a resurgence of
radicalism and instability in these areas. By delivering
material benefits to rural farmers, albeit benefits
that were unevenly distributed, this programme
served to placate elements that might otherwise
have supported radical political activity and
contributed to violence (MacIntyre 1999: 265–7). At
the same time, the expansion of the educational
system enabled the New Order to promote greater
ideological attachment to the nation-state through
the provision of school and university courses in
Panacasila, the state ideology, and the compulsory
use of the national language, in turn reducing the
scope for violent opposition to the New Order
based on regional identities.
4 The political economy of ‘reversal’
As noted earlier, the onset of the Asian economic
crisis had a devastating impact on Indonesia’s
economy and produced a partial reversal of the
country’s gains vis-à-vis turnaround during the
previous three decades. At one level, this outcome
reflected Suharto and the technocrats’
mismanagement of the process of financial sector
liberalisation over the previous decade. As Radelet
and Sachs (1998: 20) among others have pointed out,
the New Order’s financial sector reforms during this
period were ‘haphazard and partial’. While the
financial sector was extensively deregulated during
the 1980s and early 1990s, relatively little progress
was made in establishing strong systems of
prudential regulation and financial sector supervision.
The government introduced new regulatory
frameworks for the banking system and the capital
market but regulators lacked the capacity to properly
supervise the financial sector and ensure strong
enforcement of the new regulatory frameworks
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through administrative or legal mechanisms. The
result was imprudent and risky lending on the part
of banks and speculative stock and bond investments
on the part of portfolio investors. This, in turn,
contributed to problems with bad debts and
insolvency in the banking system and volatility in the
capital market. In short, it left Indonesia’s financial
system vulnerable to the sort of financial panic that
struck the country from the middle of 1997.
More fundamentally, however, the devastating
impact of the crisis on Indonesia’s economy reflected
shifts in the structure of power and interest during
the 1970s and 1980s and the implications that this
had for the process of financial sector liberalisation.
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the emergence of a
number of large private sector conglomerates, most
of which had close family or personal connections to
senior political and bureaucratic figures. The most
prominent of these were the business groups owned
by members of the Suharto family or Suharto’s
friends: the Bimantara group (which was owned by
Bambang Trihatmojo, one of Suharto’s sons); the
Humpuss group (which was owned by Hutomo
Mandala Putera, another of Suharto’s sons); the Citra
Lamtorogung group (which was owned by Siti
Hardiyanti Rukmana, Suharto’s eldest daughter); the
Salim group (which was owned by Liem Sioe Liong,
one of Suharto’s closest friends); and the Bob Hasan
group (which was owned by Bob Hasan, Suharto’s
golfing buddy). Most of these business groups had
grown rapidly as a result of privileged access to
subsidised state bank credit, import licences, forestry
concessions and other forms of state largesse,
secured through their political connections (Robison
1986; Schwarz 1994). In the early days of the New
Order, the ‘politico-bureaucrats’ who occupied the
military, the bureaucracy, and other sections of the
state apparatus were by far the dominant domestic
element in the coalition of counter-revolutionary
forces that underpinned the New Order. By the mid-
1980s, however, the conglomerates had become a
key element in this coalition, forming what one
observer called a ‘pact of domination’ (Robison 1988:
71) with the politico-bureaucrats.
The emergence of the conglomerates was to have a
significant influence on the pattern on financial
sector liberalisation during the 1980s and 1990s. In
general, the politico-bureaucrats and the
conglomerates had a common interest in preserving
state domination of the economy – for the politico-
bureaucrats, state domination of the economy
meant control over the allocation of state bank
credit, concessions, licences and other facilities and
access to the rent-generating opportunities that this
provided, while for the conglomerates, it meant
continuing to have privileged access to these
facilities. But the two had different interests in
relation to state control of the financial sector.
Whereas financial sector deregulation threatened
the politico-bureaucrats’ control over the allocation
of financial resources, it promised a variety of new
business opportunities for the conglomerates in
activities such as banking and securities trading.
When international oil prices collapsed in the mid-
1980s and the government came under structural
pressure to deregulate the economy, the
conglomerates lobbied for financial sector
deregulation whereas the politico-bureaucrats at the
central bank resisted at least certain elements of the
deregulation programme. It was only in relation to
regulatory and institutional reform in the financial
sector that both the politico-bureaucrats and the
conglomerates maintained a united front of
opposition. Both stood to lose from regulatory and
institutional reform, the politico-bureaucrats because
such reform would mean less scope for rent-seeking
and corruption and the conglomerates because it
would mean greater transparency and accountability
to financial regulators and to outside investors. With
the politico-bureaucrats and the conglomerates
retaining their political dominance – in particular
their control over the state apparatus – throughout
this period, they were able to prevent financial
sector reform from encompassing regulatory and
institutional reform (Rosser 2002; Rosser et al.
2004).
At the same time, Indonesia was also affected by
changes in its geopolitical and geo-economic
context. As Winters (1999: 35–6) has pointed out,
two developments in this respect were particularly
important in creating the conditions for the
economic crisis in Southeast Asia. The first of these
was a dramatic shift in the nature of capital flows to
developing countries. By the late 1990s, private flows
of capital had replaced foreign aid as the main source
of investment capital for developing countries. At the
same time, the dominant forms of private capital
flows to these countries had become highly mobile
commercial loan and portfolio capital flows.
Dependence on these types of capital flows in turn
placed Southeast Asian countries at increased risk of,
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at some point, a panicked withdrawal of capital. The
second development was a shift in the interests of
Western governments regarding the region. With
the end of the Cold War, the USA and other
Western governments no longer viewed East Asian
countries as a key bulwark against the communist
enemy. This in turn meant that, as Winters (1999: 35)
noted, these governments became ‘much less willing
to allow trade and investment issues to take a back
seat to security concerns’. In the Indonesian context,
the result was that Western governments and
international organisations, particularly the IMF,
were unwilling to simply bail out what they saw as a
corrupt and highly interventionist regime. While they
were willing to provide large amounts of aid to
Indonesia during the crisis, they also sought a quid
pro quo in the form of wide-ranging economic
reform.
The violence that has occurred in Indonesia since the
onset of the crisis needs to be understood in terms
of the political consequences of the economic crisis.
The crisis dramatically weakened the government’s
capacity to maintain political order through co-
optation and repression. On the one hand, the crisis
robbed the government of a significant proportion
of the patronage resources that it needed to reward
political supporters and co-opt political opponents by
causing severe fiscal problems. On the other hand,
the crisis provoked widespread criticism of the
military and police for their role in human rights
abuses under the New Order, something that made
them increasingly reluctant to respond to expressions
of political opposition with force, at least outside
regions undergoing separatist conflicts (Bourchier
1999). In this context, political space opened up for
groups that were marginalised under the New
Order to reassert themselves. Within weeks of
Suharto’s downfall, peasant groups began to
unilaterally seize back land that they felt had been
wrongfully taken away from them by the
government or business groups under the New
Order leading in a number of cases to clashes with
security forces and gangs of hired thugs. In various
parts of the country, peasant and other groups have
been involved in the kidnapping, hostage-taking or
even murder of local political leaders as they have
vented years of pent up frustration at the actions of
these individuals in relation to land. At the same
time, separatist movements in Aceh and East Timor
and their supporters renewed their calls for
independence, leading to renewed fighting and
violence in Aceh and the bloody withdrawal of
Indonesian troops from East Timor in 1999. Violence
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Figure 4 Sectoral allocation of aid to Indonesia, 1973–2002
Source OECD, Creditor Reporting System.
has also been increasingly triggered by ‘turf wars’
between the military and police over control of
protection rackets and other illegal activities at the
local level, following the formal separation of the
two organisations as part of the post-Suharto
reforms. On some occasions, the military also
appears to have provoked violence within particular
regions in order to destabilise governments whose
policies they have opposed (Rosser et al. 2004).
5 The role of donors
The role of donors in relation to Indonesia’s
performance vis-à-vis turnaround has varied
considerably over time, being much more significant
and/or positive in some periods than in others.
Donors played a relatively positive and significant role
in the initiation of turnaround in the mid- to late
1960s. First, they provided much of the finance
required to stabilise and rehabilitate the economy.
The annual aid pledges made by members of the
Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a
grouping of the country’s main foreign donors that
was established just after the New Order came to
power, were instrumental in bringing inflation under
control during 1966–8. Channelled mainly through
the Export Bonus (EB) scheme, these funds were
used by the Indonesian government to finance the
importation of various key commodities, and in doing
so reduce their prices. At the same time, donor
funds provided a key source of finance for more
development-related activities after stabilisation was
achieved, being used in particular to fund the
rehabilitation and development of economic and
social infrastructure, agricultural and other forms of
production, and the provision of social services
(Figure 4). Between 1966/7 and 1973/4, donor funds
accounted for significantly more than half the
government’s development budget. As Figure 5
illustrates, Indonesia was not highly dependent on aid
during this period, at least not in comparison with
some of the other countries examined in this study
during their periods of turnaround. Nevertheless,
overall aid levels were crucial insofar as they provided
the government with the resources that it needed
for price stabilisation and economic rehabilitation.
Second, donors – and, in particular the IMF –
provided crucial economic policy advice to the
Indonesian government. As noted above, the IMF
played a key role in assisting the technocrats devise
the economic policy programme that stabilised the
economy in 1965–6 and promoted investment and
economic growth thereafter.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, donors played a
much less significant role in relation to the country’s
performance regarding the turnaround. As Figure 5
shows, donor funding to Indonesia fell significantly as
a percentage of gross national income (GNI) during
this period, reflecting the effects of the oil boom. In
1974/5, foreign aid fell to 24 per cent of the
government’s development budget, although it
subsequently increased in 1978/9 to around 40 per
cent of the development budget (Booth and
McCawley 1981: 141). At the same time, while the
IMF and other donors continued to provide policy
advice to the government, the government was
generally less receptive to this advice than it had
been in the late 1960s. The oil boom dramatically
reduced the structural leverage that foreign donors
exerted over the Indonesian state: while their ability
to withhold aid was not affected by the oil boom,
the state’s access to alternative sources of investment
funds meant that any threats on their part to reduce
aid were not nearly as constraining on policy-makers
(Winters 1996: 95–6). This decline in receptiveness is
reflected in the nature of the government’s
economic policies during this period, which were
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generally much more statist/interventionist in
character than donors apparently preferred (Rosser
2002: 59–60; Winters 1996: 144–55).
During the 1980s and 1990s, donors became more
influential again and had a more significant (although
arguably less positive) impact on the country’s
performance vis-à-vis turnaround. The collapse of
international oil prices increased the need for the
country to mobilise new sources of investment
funds, particularly from the private sector but also
from donors. Donors responded by increasing their
aid allocations for the country – as Figure 5 shows,
foreign aid roughly doubled as a percentage of
Indonesia’s GNI during the late 1980s. Within this
context, influence over economic policy shifted away
from the politico-bureaucrats and the conglomerates
and towards donors and private investors. Donors
used their new influence to encourage the
government to deregulate the Indonesian economy,
particularly in the trade, investment and finance
sectors (World Bank 1988). After the government
introduced a range of deregulatory reforms during
the 1980s, particularly in the financial sector, they
encouraged it to take the reform process further by
introducing various prudential safeguards and other
institutional reforms (World Bank 1993b). It is in this
respect that donors had a less than positive influence
vis-à-vis turnaround during this period. By
encouraging financial sector deregulation before
adequate prudential safeguards and institutional
reforms were in place, they contributed to the
‘haphazard and partial’ pattern of financial sector
reform (Radelet and Sachs 1998) that contributed to
the onset of the 1997–8 financial crisis.
Donors’ role in the management of the crisis was
mixed. In the midst of the crisis, donors offered
significantly increased volumes of aid – between
1996 and 1999 aid flows rose from 0.4 to 1.6 per
cent of GNI and from 2.1 to 7.4 per cent of central
government expenditures. This in turn helped the
government to maintain at least a modest
development budget despite a massive increase in
public sector debt repayments. At the same time,
however, in helping the Indonesian government to
manage the crisis, donors made some serious
mistakes. For instance, the IMF, which was called in
to help the government deal with the crisis in late
1997, was widely criticised for prescribing the wrong
economic medicine: the region, it was argued, did
not need ‘wanton budget cutting, credit tightening
and emergency bank closures’ but ‘stable or even
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to
counterbalance the decline in foreign loans’ (Sachs
1997). By insisting on the former, it was argued, the
IMF severely worsened the contractionary effects of
the crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998). Furthermore, the
social safety net activities in education and health
that were such a key part of donor strategies for
protecting the poor during the crisis appear to have
been only partially effective, due mainly to problems
with the leakage of funds.
One further point should be made in relation to the
role of donors in Indonesia since the late 1960s. A
key limitation on the effectiveness of foreign aid has
been the fact that a significant proportion of it was
aimed at serving the commercial objectives of
private business groups from donor countries as
much as for developmental objectives. This was
particularly the case in relation to Japan’s aid
programme, by far the largest aid programme in
Indonesia, although it was also a feature of some
other countries’ aid programme, most notably
Australia. A key objective of Japanese aid to
Southeast Asia during the New Order period was to
promote Japanese trade and investment and
coordinate ‘the commercial agendas of private sector
actors … with the strategic and economic agendas of
the economic ministries’ (Arase 1994: 172 as quoted
in Beeson 2001: 289). Despite this, however, Japan’s
foreign aid programme does not appear to have
worked entirely against Indonesia’s economic
development, especially insofar as it served to
facilitate deeper integration with the Japanese
economy.
6 Conclusion
Since the mid-1960s, Indonesia has experienced
dramatic fluctuations in its performance vis-à-vis
turnaround. During the mid-1960s, Indonesia’s
economy was in crisis and political instability led to
massive violent conflict following the rise of the
New Order as the military sought to wipe out its
main political rival, the PKI. From the late 1960s,
however, the country entered a period of
turnaround. Between the late 1960s, the country’s
economy grew strongly, human development
proceeded apace, and the country experienced
relative political stability. By the early 1990s,
Indonesia had made such dramatic economic gains
that it was widely regarded as a ‘miracle’ economy
(World Bank 1993a). In the late 1990s, this period
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came to end, with the onset of a severe economic
crisis that led to a massive contraction in the
economy and a resurgence in violent conflict in
various parts of the country. It has been argued here
that Indonesia’s fluctuating performance regarding
the turnaround has reflected the orientations,
abilities and political skills of the country’s political
leaders during this time, particularly its two
Presidents, Sukarno and Suharto; struggles between
the main social and organisational forces within the
country and the emergence of new social forces;
the nature of the country’s geopolitical and geo-
economic environment; and ‘the nature of economic
shocks’.
Whether Indonesia can return to high levels of
economic growth, restore political stability, and
promote further human development in the future
remains to be seen. However, there are good
reasons not to be overly optimistic. Virtually none of
the conditions that facilitated turnaround in
Indonesia during the first decades or so of the New
Order exist at present. Presidential leadership since
Suharto has been weak, reflecting the decline in
presidential authority that has accompanied the
process of democratisation and constitutional change
since then, as well as the fact that post-Suharto
presidents have had far fewer economic resources at
their disposal. None of the individuals who have held
the presidency since Suharto – Habibie, Wahid,
Megawati, Yudhoyono – have shown Suharto’s
willingness to listen to technocratic advisers. Indeed,
although the technocrats – or at least a new
generation of technocrats – continue to play a role
in government, as Boediono’s reasonably long tenure
as Finance Minister attests, they have found
themselves increasingly marginalised as democratic
competition has led to increased appeal to radical
populist sentiment (Rosser et al. 2004; Hill and Basri
2000). Furthermore, the crisis has not led to the
political victory of a particular set of social forces, as
the mid-1960s did. The fractured nature of power in
post-Suharto Indonesia has meant that the country’s
political leadership has often faced strong political
resistance to reform initiatives. Finally, Indonesia
faces a much less favourable geopolitical and geo-
economic environment than it did during the 1960s
and 1970s. As noted above, Indonesia does not have
the geo-strategic importance nowadays that it had
during the Cold War era, although the US’s recent
prosecution of a ‘War on Terror’ may change that,
given the country’s recent problems with terrorist
attacks by radical Islamic groups. In addition, the East
Asian region, while still the most economically
dynamic in the world, is growing at a much slower
rate than it was at the height of the “East Asian
miracle”, limiting the flow of economic
opportunities to Indonesia from its neighbours.
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Notes
* I wish to thank Sarah Cliffe, Phil Keefer, Kathryn Casson,
Mark Robinson, David Potten and officials at the World
Bank’s Jakarta office for their comments on earlier
drafts of this article. The usual caveat applies.
1. The most important periods in Indonesia’s history, as far
as the comparative purpose of this project is concerned,
are the late 1960s and 1970s (when turnaround
occurred) and the late 1990s (when the partial reversal
occurred). Hence, the article concentrates on these
periods and the developments that preceded them and
does not examine in detail developments since the late
1990s, as interesting as these have been for other
reasons.
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